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ABSTRACT
The issue of co-ordination in welfare policy in the European
Union (EU) has been the subject of many analyses and discussions, but
still it has not attained the same level of importance given to the co-
ordination of economic policy. The aim of the paper is to determine the
situations and actions in Croatia and the EU in the eradication of pover-
ty and social exclusion. The paper starts with the theoretical and
methodological framework, which is followed by an account of the
states of affairs in EU member-states. After the description of the situ-
ation in Croatia, especially of its advantages and disadvantages as com-
pared to other transitional countries and future members of the EU, the
paper ends with a conclusion and proposals for improvement. 
Key words:
poverty, inequality, social exclusion, European Union, Croatia
INTRODUCTION
Debates about a common social and welfare policy and common
actions have long been held at a national level and are slowly but sure-
ly taking shape at the European level. In political terms, Europe has
achieved its greatest successes in fields other than social policy, with
the creation of a common market and the transition to phase three of
economic and monetary union with the introduction of the euro. This is,
of course, not to say that these successes are not also of social signifi-
cance. But it is often said that they have created more social problems
than they have solved, thus prompting action at a European level. 
The issue of co-ordination in welfare policy in the EU has been
the subject of many analyses and discussions, but still has not managed
to attain the same importance assigned to the co-ordination of econom-
ic policy. One of the most important reasons for intentions to harmonise
social policy is the wish to enable and enhance labour force mobility
because there is a belief that the (non)existence of an adequate safety
net is an important factor in worker mobility. On the other hand, EU
members often mention that because of the different levels of econom-
ic development it is very hard or almost impossible to harmonise dif-
ferent welfare systems. Harmonisation would require huge financial
resources that are at present not available. 
The aim of this paper is to determine the situations in the EU and
Croatia and actions taken to eradicate poverty and social exclusion. We
start with a brief explanation of the theoretical and methodological
framework. In the second part we discuss the situation in EU member-
states regarding poverty and inequality, as well as activities at the EU
level for reducing these unfavourable situations. Section three describes
the situation in Croatia, especially its advantages and disadvantages as
compared to other transitional countries and future members of EU.
The paper ends with a conclusion and proposals for improvement. 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
To understand poverty, it is essential to examine the economic
and social context, including the institutions of the state, markets, com-
munities, and households. The persistence of poverty is linked to its
interlocking multidimensionality: it is dynamic, complex, institutional-
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ly embedded, and also a gender and location-specific phenomenon. The
patterns and shape of poverty vary by social group, season, location,
and country. Poverty differences cut across gender, ethnicity, age, loca-
tion (rural versus urban), and income source. Usually, in households,
children and women suffer more than men. Poverty outcomes are the
result of a complex interaction between policies and institutions in the
economic and the political spheres. Poverty outcomes depend not only
on what happens with the national income, but more fundamentally on
how these changes in the national income translate into changes in
household measures, and on what happens to the distribution of this
consumption. 
It is very important to fix on the manner of measuring poverty
because this determines (or confuses) attempts to formulate sensible
policies for helping the poor and for the redistribution of income. The
most commonly used way for measuring poverty is based on income or
consumption levels (for the main indicators and explanation, see Box 1.
Information on consumption and income is obtained through sample
surveys, during which households are asked to answer detailed ques-
tions on their spending habits and sources of income. Such surveys are
conducted more or less regularly in most countries. These sample sur-
vey data collection methods are increasingly being complemented by
participatory methods, where people are asked what their basic needs
are and what poverty means for them. Interestingly, recent research
shows a high degree of concordance between poverty lines based on
objective and subjective assessments of needs. 
It is common to measure inequality in living standards using
income or expenditure across individuals in a given month. However,
due to problems in measuring poverty, income or expenditure in a
given month is only an imprecise measure of the living standard of a
household. In order to obtain a more representative approximation of
inequality, it is better (and more complicated) to reckon poverty and
inequality using data over a longer period (presumably over four peri-
ods like, for example, the average in the current month, 12, 24 and 36
months ago) than data for a single month. 
Especially for countries in transition, researchers mostly use
measures of poverty and inequality based on consumption (money
expenditures plus the value of food produced on the household plot).
Grootaert and Braithwaite (1998) believe that this measure is more
accurate than income due to the high volatility of current income, since
people are paid very irregularly, with several months of wage arrears
being common. Furthermore, income underreporting is widespread,
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Box 1 Main indicators of poverty, inequality and social exclusion
Absolute poverty measures the proportion of a population
surviving on less than a specific amount of income. This specific
amount is the poverty line. 
Absolute poverty lines set an absolute minimum standard of
living and are typically based on a fixed basket of food products
(deemed to represent the adequate minimum nutritional intake nec-
essary for good health) plus an allowance for other expenditures
(such as housing and clothing). Hence absolute lines can vary
across countries, depending on the composition of the consumption
basket. While there is clearly some arbitrariness in determining
what is adequate, the notion of a poverty line still provides a useful
benchmark. 
Relative poverty lines define poverty relative to national liv-
ing standards because irrespective of absolute needs, people may
consider themselves poor when their living standards are substan-
tially below those of others in their country. Relative poverty lines
are usually set as a fixed percentage of median or mean equivalent
household income. The World Bank (2000) calculates poverty pro-
files using 50% of median income as a base for international com-
parison.
The poverty gap measures how much income would have to
be transferred to the poor population to raise every household's
income to the poverty line (assuming the transfers have no effects
on the recipients' work effort). 
Gini coefficient is bounded between 0 and 1, with 0 indicat-
ing absolute equality and 1 indicating absolute inequality. 
Poverty intensity is the common indicator taking into
account the number of poor, the depth of poverty and inequality
among the poor. For practical purposes, the percentage change in
the poverty intensity can be approximated as the sum of the percent-
age changes of the poverty rate and the average poverty gap ratio. 
Social exclusion is a multidimensional process which weak-
ens the links between individuals and the rest of society. These links
can take on economic, political, socio-cultural and spatial perspec-
tives. The more dimensions by which a person is excluded, the
more vulnerable this person becomes. The characteristics of exclu-
sion are linked to accessing labour markets, basic services and
social networks. Depending on the general level of development of
an economy, the following dimensions can be of relevance: exclu-
sion from goods and services, from labour market, from security
and from human rights.
because survey respondents are not willing to fully disclose illegal or
semi-legal income sources. Finally, produce from the household plot
has become a mainstay of food consumption and this is not a standard
component of money income. While consumption may be a more accu-
rate measure of material well-being, examining income inequality
offers two benefits. First, it is easier to make international comparisons
using income inequality since income inequality statistics are available
for more countries. Secondly, it can produce insights into the drivers of
inequality by decomposing income inequality into the contributions of
the various income sources (World Bank, 2000). 
However, the above discussion suggests that it might be fruitful
to consider income and expenditure not as alternative, but rather as
complementary, measures of well-being. Support for this approach is
provided by Atkinson (1989), who distinguishes between two concep-
tions of poverty: a standard-of living approach, which emphasises min-
imum levels of consumption of goods and leads naturally to an expen-
diture-based measure, and a minimum-rights approach, which empha-
sises the provision of minimum incomes but does not prescribe how
they should be spent.
POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL
EXCLUSION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The drive for solidarity and social integration found its initial
expression in the Single European Act (1987), and subsequently in the
Protocol on Social Policy in the Maastricht Treaty (signed 1992,
applied from 1993). The idea was to refine social protection systems in
order to improve everybody’s chances in general without losing sight
of the goal of more equal opportunities. The Treaty of Amsterdam
(entry into force: 1st May 1999) gave concrete expression to this con-
cern by including a title on employment and incorporating the protocol
on social policy. This gave the Community some scope for action in the
field of social policy, though this was somewhat restricted and bound
by the principle of subsidiarity. Since then, the Commission and the
Member States have had to review the employment situation annually
and draw up employment policy guidelines. This has brought social
policy much further into the limelight of European politics. In late
1997, when the situation in virtually all labour markets was giving
cause for concern, the Luxembourg employment summit was held.
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Measures were decided on to stimulate the efficiency of labour mar-
kets. The Cardiff summit (June 1998) focused on stepping up the pace
of structural reform in the employment market, whilst Cologne (June
1999) concentrated on promoting sound, non-inflationary growth to
create new jobs.i
However, it is really only since the Lisbon European Council
meeting of March 2000 that we have deemed social policy to be on a
par with economic, monetary and financial policy. In the course of this
development, a common goal has emerged: the European social model
must not just be maintained, it must also be adapted and consolidated.
The EU set itself a new strategic goal for the current decade: “To
become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy
in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and
better jobs and greater social cohesion”. Successful implementation of
the Lisbon strategy depends upon simultaneous and coherent policy
action being taken in a wide range of areas in the economic, social and
environmental domains.
No doubt, the issues of poverty, inequality, social exclusion and
welfare policy have the key role in reaching the mentioned goal. Social
policy and social cohesion are directly included in the principal areas
under the shared competence of EU members. On the other hand, there
are huge differences in EU members in terms of current situation and
policy towards the eradication of poverty and increasing social inclu-
sion, as well as of general attitude to welfare policy and the role of
state. Thus, it is probably neither desirable nor possible to develop a
single comprehensive European definition of the content of welfare
policy of general interest and its role. However, existing Community
legislation on welfare policy of general economic and social interest
contains a number of common elements that can be drawn on to define
a useful Community concept of welfare policy and its realization.
These elements should have such desirable characteristics as economic
efficiency, social or territorial cohesion and safety and security for all
citizens. The future desired concept should be used by all countries in
proposing and implementing an adequate policy capable of reducing
poverty and social exclusion.
The EU Summit in Nice in December 2000 reinforced a number
of the proposals made in Lisbon. The most significant of these in rela-
tion to combating poverty and social exclusion is the approval of a new
Social Policy Agenda (Official Journal of the European Communities,
2001). In setting out priorities for action in social policy over the next
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five years, strategic guidelines were identified as follows, all of them
having a bearing on anti-poverty policy: (1) more and better jobs; (2)
anticipating and capitalizing on changes in the working environment by
creating a new balance between flexibility and security; and (3) com-
bating poverty, exclusion and discrimination in order to promote social
integration. 
One of the most significant developments has been the approval
of the proposal for a National Action Plan against Poverty and Social
Exclusion (NAPincl) in EU members.ii The NAPincl is intended to
develop a common EU-wide basis for national actions against poverty
and social exclusion. The NAPincl has four main objectives: (1) to
facilitate participation in employment and access by all to resources,
rights, goods and services; (2) to prevent the risks of exclusion; (3) to
help the most vulnerable; and (4) to mobilize all relevant bodies.
The NAPincl is intended to bring social and employment poli-
cies closer together at both the national and EU level. An increased
emphasis on indicators and monitoring of progress is evident in relation
to the NAPincl. A bilateral meeting to discuss the NAPincl should take
place between different social representatives (including Governments,
Social Partners and relevant Agencies) and the European Commission.
All countries have national insurance systems which protect
their citizens from major risks like unemployment, the loss of income
or subsistence; special needs for sickness, family burdens or poverty.
However, both the extent and the consignment of such social insurance
differ widely among these countries. Many analyses have found empir-
ical evidence for a high correlation between expenditures for social
insurance and the incidence of poverty (for example Voges and
Kazepov, 1998). It seems that the differences between countries con-
cerning the reduction of poverty incidence result more from the extent
of the welfare state than from the varying effectiveness of poverty
reduction policies. 
Over the last few decades, unemployment, poverty and inequal-
ity have generally increased in Europe, although there have been peri-
ods (notably the late 1980s) and countries (for example, the
Netherlands and Denmark) where social conditions have improved or
at least not deteriorated. In almost all EU members a main factor con-
tributing to poverty and social exclusion is unemployment, especially
long-term joblessness. The EU average unemployment rate increased
from 2.3 in 1960 to 7.7% in the year 2001. But while some countries
have managed to halt and even reverse the rise (notably the Nether-
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lands, Ireland and the UK), others could only achieve partial success,
which still leaves unemployment rates much higher than in the 1970s
(for example, Sweden, Germany, France and Spain). 
Table 1 Unemployment rates in June 2003 (%) 
EU15 8.1 Sweden 5.4
Euro-zone 8.9 Portugal 7.3
Luxembourg 3.7 Belgium 8.0
Netherlandsa 4.1 Finland 9.3
Austria 4.4 France 9.4
Ireland 4.7 Germany 9.4
Denmarka 5.2 Spain 11.4
a data for May
Source: Eurostat (2003)
As we can see in Table 1, the average unemployment rate is over
8% (higher in the Euro-zone than in the EU15). The lowest rate is in
Luxembourg and the highest in Spain. The risk of social exclusion
increases with the length of unemployment. So, long-term unemploy-
ment (waiting for job longer than one year) is regarded as a primary
indicator of social exclusion. In 2001, 3% of EU’s active population
were unemployed for at least 12 months. Again, this percentage con-
ceals differences: from less than 1% in Luxembourg, Denmark,
Netherlands and Austria, to more than 5% in Greece and Italy.
Otto and Goebel (2002), using cross-sectional equivalent
income, analyze the poverty rate (incidence) and intensity of poverty in
European countries. The ranking of poverty incidence among the coun-
tries analyzed is relatively robust. The representatives of socio-demo-
cratic welfare states - Denmark and Finland - have the lowest rates of
poverty incidence (more than 5%). The highest poverty incidence is
found in southern European countries (Portugal and Greece more than
20%). With the exception of Ireland, the poverty intensity measure
yields the same picture of poverty. 
Spells of poverty are also important indicators of a particular sit-
uation. Regarding permanent poverty there are also huge differences
among EU members. Extreme positions are found in Denmark and
Portugal: permanent poverty is a small phenomenon in Denmark, while
permanent poverty in Portugal is the highest. Thus, more than 20% of
the Portuguese population can be described as permanently poor. In all
other EU members less than 10% are permanently poor. 
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In spite of many surveys, (more about this in Dauderstädt, 2002),
it is almost impossible to determine the trends of (in)equality in the EU.
Inequality (not only in Europe) cannot be sensibly studied only
in terms of income distribution statistics - despite the importance they
have - because there is the issue of political debate linked with an
inequality of another kind, that of political participation. Thus, in ana-
lyzing unemployment, poverty and the related social exclusion there
should be some attention to at least some of the distinct concerns for the
person and society as a whole. Sen (1997) believes that the list of men-
tioned concerns would have to include among other things, for a socie-
ty: loss of current output and fiscal burden; for a person: loss of free-
dom of decision (which goes well beyond decline in income); skill loss
and long-term damage (just as people learn by doing, they also unlearn
by not doing – by being out of work and out of practice); psychologi-
cal harm, health problems and damage to morale; motivational loss and
loss of future work; loss of human relations and family life (unemploy-
ment and poverty can be very disruptive for social relations and may
also weaken the harmony and coherence within the family, as links
with friends and relatives), and finally, loss of social values and respon-
sibility (people in long term unemployment and poverty can develop
cynicism about the fairness of social arrangements, and also a percep-
tion of dependence on others. These effects are not conducive to
responsibility and self-reliance). 
Inequality would be much higher without the correcting influ-
ence of redistributive and social policies. Social expenditure as a per-
centage of GDP increased significantly in most countries between 1960
and 2000, due to aging populations and higher unemployment. It con-
tinued to rise, especially in the poorer Southern European countries –
including Italy – as well as in France and Finland. As a consequence,
the EU average share of social benefit in GDP continued to increase as
well, in spite of the relatively stable or even falling shares in some
countries (Germany, Austria, Netherlands). The effect of social trans-
fers (excluding pensions) in reducing the at-risk-of-poverty rate varied
greatly between Member States. Social transfers had the strongest
effect in Sweden and Denmark and the weakest in Italy and Greece
(Eurostat News Release, 2003). 
Results by Simón et all. (2003) suggest that there is no evidence
of long-run or strong convergence in social protection expenditure on
GDP ratios to imply equalisation of the importance of social transfers.
However, they do find evidence of catching-up or weak convergence
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with respect to both Germany and the EU-12 average for all countries,
except Greece. These results, in turn, suggest that some countries have
been making a stronger effort as far as social protection is concerned,
resulting in their situation converging on that of other countries where
social protection expenditure has been much more significant all
through the period. The enlargement of the Union is bringing more het-
erogeneous, but particularly poorer players onto the leveled playing
field. Competition from the numerous poorer regions will exacerbate
problems of welfare systems that are already being subjected to mas-
sive pressures of adjustment as a result of demography and globalisa-
tion. There is a risk of increasing unemployment and inequality, and
this often means that national governments are unable to implement the
necessary painful reforms (Dauderstädt, 2002).   
It is very hard to estimate future trends of poverty and inequality
in new members of the EU, but something could be learned from previ-
ous EU enlargements. The Portuguese and the Spanish experiences after
accession to the EU provide a natural field in which to search for the
determinants of the distributive implications of economic integration.
According to the results by Jimeno et all. (2000), inequality increased,
with some exceptions, for both countries after their accession to EU.
We should stress that the EU is trying to eradicate poverty and
reduce inequality and social exclusion. For new members of the EU an
increased future polarisation of society can be predicted. On one hand,
there is an important (growing) proportion of young and relatively well-
educated people with rather good employment opportunities and rela-
tively high wages. On the other side, there is persistent or increasing
number of older unskilled or semi-skilled workers, participating most-
ly in the unofficial labour market, who are more likely to be made
redundant, to have lower wages and temporary employment. With an
adequate and well targeted welfare policy, the position of the latter
group could be improved. 
POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND SOCIAL
EXCLUSION IN CROATIA 
Poverty increased dramatically in most of the transition coun-
tries of Europe during the past decade. Not only is the increase in
poverty unprecedented, but it has taken place in the context of profound
changes in economic, social, and political life. In most of Central and
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South Eastern Europe certain subgroups of the population have a high-
er incidence of poverty than others - particularly the unemployed, the
less educated and the rural population. 
Poverty and inequality are serious obstacles to economic
growth, especially in transitional countries, because high inequality
leads to a sharper crisis in response to external shock as distributional
conflicts between the rich and the poor impair the functioning of the
newly established democracy. Higher inequality leads to significantly
higher rates of violent crime because of the relatively higher pay-off
from crime to those who are poor. Inequality also leads to deterioration
of the (already small) social capital and lower participation in civil
society, thus reducing opportunities for the poor to influence policies. 
Although the collapse of output and increasing inequality can
account for much of the quantitative rise in poverty, these two factors
are in some sense just proximate causes, behind which lies a complex
interaction of economic, social, and political processes. These underly-
ing processes help explain why outcomes diverged as much as they did
and are the key to how the worst outcomes may be improved. The ques-
tion to answer is not so much whether poverty rose because output col-
lapsed and inequality rose - the answer is an unambiguous yes - but
why did output collapse so much more in some countries than in oth-
ers? And why did inequality follow such different patterns? Almost the
most important factor behind the path of output and incomes was the
extent and quality of the economic reforms that countries chose to
implement. There is a strong correlation between comprehensive
reform and output performance (World Bank, 2000). Analysts, howev-
er, are beginning to realize that other factors may have mattered just as
much: initial conditions (including location, initial economic distor-
tions, and resource endowment); the state of institutions at the start of
the transition; and the political system. These factors had a direct and
strong impact on output as well. Moreover, these non-policy factors
fundamentally affected the choice of reforms and the extent to which
countries were able to implement them (EBRD, 1999). And these fac-
tors also had an independent impact on the distribution of income and
consumption, and hence on the level of poverty.
Poverty 
Knowledge about the incidence and scope of poverty in Croatia
was very limited until analytical work on poverty and vulnerability car-
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ried out by the World Bank (2001) in collaboration with the Gov-
ernment became available. The analysis was based on the first post-war
household budget survey in Croatia, carried out by the Croatian Bureau
of Statistics in 1998. Results showed that poverty in Croatia is relative-
ly low, i.e., lower than in most transition economies in the region
(except for Slovenia) (Table 2). Only 4% of the population lived on less
than US$4.30 a day at PPP (internationally comparable standard across
transition economies), and about 10% lived on less than US$5.30 a day,
which the study suggested as an appropriate absolute poverty line for
Croatia. 
Table 2 Poverty rates according to an international poverty standard1 (in %)
Country Year Poverty rate
Belarus 1996 20.5
Croatia  1998 4.0
Estonia 1998 19.3
Hungary 1997 15.4
Latvia 1998 34.8
Lithuania 1998 22.5
Moldova  1997 68.6
Poland 1998 18.4
Romania 1998 44.5
Russia 1998 50.3
Slovenia 1993-95 Less than 1.0
Ukraine 1996 35.5
1 US $ 4.30 per person per day
Source: World Bank (2001); for Slovenia Milanovic (1998)
This international standard, however, may not adequately reflect
the specific conditions of each society. For policy makers what matters
is the extent of poverty based on nationally relevant standards. There is
no national official poverty line in Croatia. The World Bank study has
estimated the level of total expenditures (including non-food items) of
households in Croatia at which families, after paying for essential non-
food expenditures, just attain the minimal nutritional needs. This level
of expenditure represents therefore an absolute poverty line and
amounts to 41,500 kuna per year (in 1998 prices) for a couple with two
children or 15,474 kuna for an “equivalent adult”. Around 10% of the
population falls below this nationally specific poverty line. 
However, poverty in Croatia is characterized by stagnancy -
those who become poor take a great deal of time to escape from pover-
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ty (World Bank, 2001). There are several dominant groups of poor: the
unemployed and inactive persons, the poorly educated and the elderly.
Although the unemployed and inactive represent a small share of the
poor population in the Croatia (2.9% and 5.4%), they are exposed to the
biggest threat from poverty, while employment is a fairly reliable pro-
tection against poverty. Almost three-fourths of the poor live in fami-
lies whose head has primary education or less. These individuals are
likely to have little prospect of finding work if they are not employed,
or to have low earnings if they are employed. The risk of poverty is par-
ticularly high when poor education is combined with unemployment.
Those living in households with unemployed or inactive household
heads are around 3 times more likely to be poor than the population as
a whole. Thus, poverty in Croatia - having become much more like
poverty in Western Europe – is highly correlated with the situation in
the formal labour market and the skill of individuals (Grootaert and
Braithwaite, 1998).
There is a considerable body of information about welfare recip-
ients in Croatia. Unfortunately, this does not cover detailed analysis of
welfare recipients of working age registered as unemployed. The
Croatian Employment Service does not identify those registrants in
receipt of welfare. The Ministry of Labour and Social Policy has limit-
ed dis-aggregations of unemployed welfare clients. And there is little
research on the characteristics of the group. 
However, one study (Šuæur, 2001) does offer some insights into
the economic and demographic characteristics of unemployed welfare
recipients in Croatia (the most important welfare right is the mainte-
nance allowance - pomoæ za uzdravanje). The first aim of the survey
was to make distinctions between certain subgroups of users, particu-
larly according to their working (in)activity and how long they had
been receiving maintenance allowances. The second aim was to deter-
mine which factors were decisive in determining the duration of the
period of receiving assistance. Šuæur makes a distinction between
recipients of social welfare (the individual appearing as the applicant
for assistance) and users (includes formal applicants and all their fam-
ily members using the received aid). The research was conducted on a
sample of 500 recipients of social welfare. According to their employ-
ment status, welfare recipients can be categorized into two dominant
groups: the unemployed and the incapacitated. In comparison to other
transitional countries, Croatia has a higher share of unemployed in all
welfare recipients. This is the consequence of structural changes that
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have occurred in Croatia. It is important to stress that more than half of
unemployed welfare recipients have been without a job for more than
five years.
The duration of welfare assistance differs significantly in statis-
tical terms, depending on age, level of education and region where the
recipients originated. The older and less educated recipients are more
likely to remain longer in the welfare scheme. The average period of
welfare scheme usage is quite long (almost 5 years). According to
regression analysis, it could be assumed that welfare assistance would
be used for a longer period by applicants of higher age, of lower level
of education, who are unmarried and living in incomplete families, who
have no displaced person or refugee status and who receive other ben-
efits available under the social welfare scheme. The finding of this
research can serve to identify risk groups and to suggest certain meas-
ures aimed at improving the status of income support users. 
However, despite the high percentage of social transfers in GDP
(around 25%) Croatia has achieved little redistribution. This is because
most social spending programmes are relatively poorly targeted, while
the relatively well targeted social assistance programmes are fragment-
ed and account for a small portion of total social spending. Instead of
reducing inequality, the overall welfare system acts to enhance it
(World Bank, 2001). 
Poverty in Croatia is not only relatively low, but also shallow. The
poverty gap is 1.8% and on average the consumption of a poor household
is 20.7% below the poverty line. To raise all the poor out of poverty with
perfect targeting (i.e., each poor person is given a transfer exactly equal
to the poverty gap) would cost only about 1% of GDP. Croatia is thus
perfectly able to eliminate absolute poverty.
Those who have the misfortune to be poor are seriously
deprived. Life of the poor differs in many respects from the non-poor.
The poor tend to live in overcrowded, poorly maintained dwellings;
their diet is limited to basic staples (especially for the urban poor who
can afford little beyond basic staples); and they are poorly educated.
Only few have savings; they are often immobile, and their social net-
works are very limited. Poverty in Croatia has already many features of
a permanent state: the poor are unlikely to escape poverty easily. This
is due to two basic reasons: 
• There are limited economic opportunities because growth so far has
not generated enough jobs. Many old jobs have been destroyed and
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very few new jobs have been created. Growth has benefited primari-
ly those who kept their jobs. But for those locked outside employ-
ment, the effect was close to nil, if not negative. Furthermore, over-
regulation of employment, especially constraints on layoffs, are lim-
iting opportunities for small businesses and flexible working arrange-
ments. Small businesses and flexible working arrangements could
constitute a viable alternative to wage employment for the poor. 
• The poor are at a disadvantage with respect to benefiting even from
this limited set of opportunities. Once locked outside employment, the
unemployed and economically inactive have limited capacities to
break out of the circle of impoverishment. Over half of the unem-
ployed are long-term unemployed, so analysis of labour market flows
suggests that both the unemployed and the inactive are unlikely to
find new jobs. 
Most working-age individuals who are not employed have either
very low educational endowments (primary) or narrowly formed skills
(vocational school graduates). Those who are currently locked outside
remunerative employment due to their level of education are also like-
ly to see their limited opportunities perpetuated for their children. 
The first national study of poverty was carried out in 1998
(World Bank, 2001). According to its findings, Croatia has relatively
low poverty rates, especially compared to the other countries in transi-
tion. However, poverty in Croatia is of a persistent nature: those who
become poor take a great deal of time to escape poverty. There are sev-
eral dominant groups of the poor: the elderly and poorly educated, the
unemployed and inactive persons.
Inequality
According to the survey by the World Bank (2001) mentioned,
income inequality measured by the Gini coefficient in 1998 is 0.39,
which is higher than in most neighbouring transition countries. Nestiæ
(2003) objects to the definition of income from self-employment, argu-
ing that it results in overestimation of inequality. Contrary to the gen-
eral perception that inequality increases rapidly over the last ten years,
according to the data he presented there was no strong increase in
income inequality. The compromise value of the Gini coefficient
increased from 0.286 in 1988 to 0.297 in 1998.
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Table 3 Inequality and social spending in accession countries
Country Gini coefficient Social spending (% of GDP)
1987–1990 1996–1998
Pensions Health 
(1997) (2000)
Bulgaria 0.23 0.41 6.2 3.9
Croatia1 0.292 0.303 13.0 8.6
Czech Republic 0.19 0.25 8.9 7.2
Estonia 0.24 0.37 7.64 6.1
Hungary 0.21 0.25 9.4 6.8
Latvia 0.24 0.32 10.7 5.9
Lithuania 0.23 0.34 7.0 6.0
Poland 0.28 0.33 15.1 6.0
Romania 0.23 0.30 6.844 2.9
Slovakia n.d. n.d. 8.0 5.9
Slovenia 0.22 0.30 14.4 8.6
1 Compromise value  21988  31998  41993  
Source: World Bank, (2002); Barr, (2001); WHO (2002); Nestiæ (2003)
Inequality increased in all transitional countries, especially in
Bulgaria and Estonia. In 1996-1998 the Gini coefficient for Croatia was
higher than the coefficients for Czech Republic and Hungary, but much
lower than the coefficients for the Baltic countries and Poland (future
members of EU). Milanovic (1998) demonstrates that the increase in
the Gini coefficient in transitional countries in central Europe was
mainly influenced by the growth of the wage concentration coefficient,iii
while the change in income structure contributed to the decrease in
inequality. The sole change in the income composition in Croatia is
similar to the changes in other transition economies. A decrease in the
share of wages and an increase in the share of pensions, other social
transfers and other personal income (excluding wages) during the tran-
sition period are obviously common to all transition economies.
However, the changes in concentration coefficients were very unusual
in Croatia. Milanovic (1998) shows that in transition countries there
was a considerable increase in wage and pension concentration. A
slight increase was observed in the concentration of other private
income, while all other social transfers strongly contributed to the
decrease in inequality. At the same time, Croatia saw a weak increase
in wage concentration and a mild decline in pension concentration. The
equalising effect of other social transfers weakened, while the concen-
tration of other private income (income from self-employment and
from property) grew markedly. 
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The percentage of pension and disability insurance and for
health insurance in Croatia in GDP is high and is not sustainable in the
long run. Croatia has almost concluded its pension reform, which
should also be an important factor for providing security for older citi-
zens. Of course, it will be necessary really to see its impacts on pover-
ty and inequality in Croatia, as well as to look forward to the finaliza-
tion of health reform.  
In spite of the general perception that inequality in Croatia
increased strongly during the transition period, according to the results
of Nestiæ (2003) it did not rise tremendously. Thus, the Gini coefficient
rose from 0.286 in 1988 to 0.297 in 1998. Decomposition of the Gini
changes shows that the expansion of social transfers as well as the
absence of any major rise in wage concentration account for there being
only a mild increase in inequality.
CONCLUSION 
We might recall that absolute poverty in Croatia is low, but this
diagnosis is deceptively consolatory. The characteristics of the poor in
the Croatia are very similar to those of the deprived population in other
transitional countries in Central and South East Europe, and are mostly
determined by education, number of income earners, employment sta-
tus. The risk of poverty is especially high for households where the
main income earner is unemployed or inactive. There are several dom-
inant groups of the poor, primarily the unemployed and inactive per-
sons. The type of economic growth in Croatia has failed to generate
enough economic opportunities for the poor, and they are at a disadvan-
tage with respect to benefiting from these opportunities. 
Generally, poverty cannot be reduced if long-term sustainable eco-
nomic growth does not occur. Absolute poverty can be alleviated if at least
two conditions are met: economic growth must occur - or mean income
must rise - on a sustained basis; and economic growth must be neutral with
respect to income distribution or it must reduce income inequality.
Equitable growth is of the utmost importance for several reasons. Firstly,
it will raise incomes of the working poor, giving them an opportunity to
escape poverty. Secondly, it will provide employment opportunities for
the unemployed and inactive workers – a group with an especially high
risk of poverty. Thirdly, it will provide the tax base for programs to alle-
viate poverty among those who cannot escape poverty otherwise.
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Three conditions are required to achieve equitable growth: sus-
taining macroeconomic stability, creating an enabling environment for
private businesses, and increasing investment in human capital. This
would involve redefining the frontier between the state and the market
on efficiency grounds: the state should withdraw from activities that are
inherently a market domain. A major problem with the economic poli-
cies advocated for the transition period is that they have been based on
minimizing the role of the state. But because of the prolonged and com-
plex nature of the transition, the responsibilities of the state should
increase rather than decrease. This does not imply a return to an
authoritarian, undemocratic state. It also does not mean that the state
should be large relative to the private economy, and certainly not that it
should try to dictate the direction of the economy. It does imply that the
state should be activist and intervene in critical areas where market
forces cannot ensure an efficient allocation of resources or where
access to basic assets and opportunities for people’s livelihoods is
inequitable. In all these things mentioned, accession to the EU could be
helpful, but one should be realistic and not expect too much. Further
strengthening of democratic institutions and opening up Croatia to clos-
er integration with European and global structures should also help to
bring about a reduction in poverty.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Future EU membership will not be able to settle any possible
Croatian inconsistencies and unwillingness to seriously formulate and
implement a financially sustainable and efficient social policy and pro-
gramme for poverty alleviation. Although declining (Štulhofer and
Rimac, 2002), there is still highly widespread and/or deeply rooted
paternalism in Croatia – a belief that government should (or is obliged
and able to) solve all existential problems of its citizens. However,
there is no single model for the eradication of poverty, economic
inequality and social exclusion that is optimal for all societies. Like
every other country, Croatia has to find and develop constitutional and
legal arrangements that best suit its own historical, social, cultural and
economic situations, conditions and possibilities. From the abundant
economic and social literature as well as from everyday practice it is
quite obvious that government (not only Croatian) is incapable of solv-
ing the mentioned issues. Government could provide a stable legal
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framework, the social infrastructure and with the co-operation of its cit-
izens establish the rule of law. Otherwise, the poor and socially exclud-
ed will suffer most from the lack of clear laws and unwillingness of
society to respect those that do exist. It is not so important to produce
new laws and changes in the organization structure, but to enhance
respect for the current laws. However, in order to make the laws work,
political will and leadership commitment is vital. Just as important is
the empowerment of citizens and their full participation in the political
process. Such a paradigm shift takes time and is more likely to be
attained through the younger generation.
Although recent economic performance has on the whole been
satisfactory, Croatia faces more demands than many former socialist
states. Both the demands of transition and of post-war reconstruction
call for an increase in the level of investment. This, in turn, implies a
need to raise the domestic savings rate and possibly to attract resources
from abroad. This objective imposes limits on the type and scale of
social programmes that can be adopted at the present time. Croatia's
prospects for economic growth and job creation look good, provided
that fiscal retrenchment and reforms continue. With continued political
stability, the Government should be well positioned to advance
reforms. There are risks, however, of policy slippage, and vulnerabili-
ty to adverse external developments, including a risk of slower growth
and constrained access to international capital markets.
Approaches to poverty reduction could be categorized into two
alternatives: technocratic or institutional. The former emphasizes tar-
geting and explores programme designs that try to direct limited
resources to the people with the greatest need. The latter approach notes
that the poor lack political power, and that administrative incompetence
and corruption hinder government delivery of services. Poverty reduc-
tion therefore requires institutional development, and changed political
structures, improved governance, and changed attitudes towards the
poor. 
Substantial poverty reduction could thus be achieved in Croatia
by careful reallocation of expenditures and improvement of coordina-
tion among existing social programmes. The Government reviewed the
policy and public expenditure implications, and accepted a National
Poverty Reduction Strategy in early 2002 (Vlada RH, 2002). Two key
recommendations emerged: (a) adopt a scheme to prompt a more com-
prehensive role for NGOs in providing services to the poor through out-
sourcing, and (b) ensure closer integration between social assistance
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programmes and education and employment services, in order to
enhance the chances of the poor and unemployed returning to work.
Initiatives in these areas should improve the effectiveness of social
spending over time. To achieve more efficient allocation of resources,
free market mechanisms are vital, but so are mechanisms concerning
social equity. Reforms to build thriving, sustainable market economies
will only succeed if built on successful investment in people. 
Successful poverty alleviation is directly linked with consistent
increase in decentralization of sources and services. The structure of
intergovernmental relations affects the efficiency and equity of service
delivery, the social safety net, and poverty alleviation programmes. A
further, more practical problem with central government failure is that
often, because of poor performance at the local level, everyone who can
afford it avoids governmental services. Instead of going to the public
school or public hospital, citizens begin to look for private schools, pri-
vate hospitals, and even private security firms. This not only weakens
the role of the state but leaves the government with the weakest and
most needy part of the population which increases the burdens on gov-
ernmental services and often affects quality adversely. The allocation
of poverty programme grants at the subnational level should be ana-
lyzed carefully within the particular Croatian context since lack of
transparency, or inadequate specificity in transfer design, may some-
times result in wealthier areas receiving more resources than poorer
areas.
Market forces alone can never be relied on to produce a fair or
equitable society. The state must be committed to the reduction of
poverty and inequality, and in order to do so, it must maintain a trans-
parent and equitable system of social protection that relies on a founda-
tion of universal coverage and non-discrimination. It is necessary to
strengthen the social safety net through improved targeting and moni-
toring of social welfare programmes, empowering civil society in the
provision of social services, decentralisation of some social services,
improving the targeting of social assistance, and better design of
employment policy measures. A primary aim of policy must be to get
people into work - or back into work. For most people most of the time,
dependency on state assistance cannot provide a satisfactory alternative
to employment - in terms of either psychological satisfaction or mate-
rial well-being. The opportunity of paid employment is among the sim-
plest ways of escaping poverty and dependency. It is desirable, wher-
ever possible, that people are found (or find themselves) jobs in the for-
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mal sector. Not only are such jobs more secure, in general, they also
offer more opportunities for training and the acquisition of skills.
Further more, they will increase the tax base and, in some measure
allow a reduction in indirect labour costs. 
The low employment rate, or rather an increase in employment,
currently represents one of the main priorities of economic policy in
Croatia. There is clearly a strong association between poverty, educa-
tion, employability and long term unemployment. The problem of long
term unemployment is growing. There has been a continual rise in the
share of the long-term unemployed - those who have been waiting for
more than one year for a job now account for more than a half of all
unemployed. The task is to reduce both the flows into long-term unem-
ployment and the stock of people already out of work for more than a
year. The problems faced by many of the long-term jobless are often
multi-dimensional and frequently include low levels of education and
of motivation. Croatia has a range of active and passive measures to
assist the unemployed. The employability of the long-term unemployed
should be enhanced and social exclusion reduced through participation
in work related activities. There is also the lack of timely evaluation to
assess the true effectiveness of policy measures on the labour market.
This could be addressed through the introduction of new techniques
(tracking studies) for collecting up-to-the-minute data about their
impact. 
There is a need for two types of activities in order to improve
public awareness of and access to social programs. First, to support the
reform of the whole social and welfare system, the Ministry of Labour
and Welfare should create a plan for a public education campaign to
inform members of the public about all changes in the legislation, pro-
cedures and new nation-wide social programmes. Then, social pro-
grammes available to the citizens under the reformed system and pro-
vided through the welfare centres by national, regional and local self-
governments should be well publicized through the different systems of
on-going publicity for the potential beneficiary. This system should
include the dissemination of information through various means about
the different benefits available through the particular welfare centre.   
Collection of poverty indicators and an accompanying poverty
analysis are important for the sake of acquiring a compact and detailed
insight into the social situation in Croatia. One of the goals should be
to establish the official poverty rate. Objective poverty analysis can
help to put poverty issues in an adequate place on the political priority
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list, at both a national and a local level. Poverty indicators can be a
good base for defining and shaping different measures of social policy.
Monitoring the effects of a social programme is also one of the purpos-
es of these indicators.
Finally, one should recommend that some effort be invested in
improving the quality, range and frequency of collecting data, informa-
tion and social statistics as well as in enhancing research about pover-
ty, economic inequality and social exclusion. Such information and
research are required for social planning and for the formulation of
appropriate policies. If the objective is for safety nets to reach the poor,
information is required on who the poor are and where they are locat-
ed, and how much of the benefits from the programme are reaching this
target group. In most cases, (especially transitional) countries spend
significant resources on safety nets but fail to collect data and monitor
who receives the benefits and how they were affected by them. Such
information should also be made available to the research community
and general public. These two steps will help to make government at all
levels more accountable to the electorate, by providing voters with
more information about the impact of government policies, which
should also raise the quality of public debate and increase the participa-
tion of citizens in the political decision-making process.
i Details about all summits and related documents can be found on http://europa.eu.int.
ii For the activities of the Council of the European Union see http://www.eapn.org, for
Finland http://www.stm.fi/Resource.phx/eng/index.htx, for Ireland http://portal.wel-
fare.ie and http://www.entemp.ie.
iii The concentration coefficient shows inner inequality in distribution of particular
income, but also its correlation with total income. The coefficient ranges from -1,
when the entire income source is received by the poorest (by income) recipient;
through 0, when all recipients receive the same amount; to 1, when the entire income
source is received by the richest recipients. A concentration coefficient's negative (or
positive) value shows that a given source is negatively (or positively) correlated with
overall income (Milanovic, 1998:16).
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